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The Lessons of Living Gardens and
Jewish Process Theology for
Authorship and Moral Rights
Roberta R. Kwall*
ABSTRACT
This Article examines the issues of authorship, fixation, and
moral rights through the lens of Jewish Process Theology. Jewish
Process Theology is an application of Process Thought, which espouses
a developmental and fluid perspective with respect to creation and
creativity. This discipline offers important insights for how to shape
and enforce copyright law. The issue of "change" and authorship is
more important now than ever before given how the digital age is
revolutionizing the way the world thinks about authorship. By
incorrectly maintaining that a living garden is not capable of copyright
protection since it is unfixed, changeable, and partially the product of
nonhuman authorship, a recent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit illustrates the need for interdisciplinary
guidance with respect to copyright law and policy.
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In the United States, copyright protection subsists from the
moment of a work's "creation."' This protection is a cardinal rule, and
yet, the underlying issues of how and when "creation" occurs are
rarely, if ever, explored. The theoretical predicate of the current
copyright statute is that as soon as an author creates a copyrightable
work of authorship and fixes that work in a tangible medium of
expression, the law entitles the work to protection. 2 That said, what is
the scope of copyright protection for works designed to continually
develop? Moreover, can fluid works of authorship even be capable of
copyright protection? Not many scholars have written about how
copyright should address works of authorship that are continually in
progress or otherwise subject to change on an ongoing basis.3
Perhaps copyright scholars are so accustomed to this copyright
trope that they fail to contemplate sufficiently the implications of this
rule of law from both a theoretical and practical perspective. On a
theoretical level, the notion that a work of authorship, once "created,"
never undergoes change or modification goes against the norms of
creativity theory. 4 On a practical level, certain works do indeed evolve
and change, necessitating judgments about whether the law should
protect them, and if so, in what manner.
This reality is especially important in the digital age. In 2011,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit grappled with
copyright and moral rights issues concerning a work subject to
change.5 In Kelley v. Chicago Park District, the court held that a
living garden of wildflowers composed of two enormous elliptical
flowerbeds did not embody the type of authorship with fixation
capable of supporting copyright protection. 6 As a result, the court also
held that the garden was not protectable under the Visual Artists
Rights Act (VARA), the moral rights statute that protects an author's
1. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006) (applying to works created on or after January 1, 1978).
2. Id. § 102(a).
3. This dearth of discussion is particularly surprising given that law professors spend
a majority of their time writing articles that are constantly in a state of flux. Even after
publication, many of this author's colleagues would like to take a crack at revising prior works,
and some actually do so in the form of sequels or books.
4. See infra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
5. See Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 380
(2011).
6. Id. at 303.
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right to safeguard the integrity of her work by preventing
unauthorized modifications and requiring appropriate attribution.7
VARA requires that a covered work qualify for copyright protection.8
The case is a difficult one to the extent that it requires interpretation
not only of copyright law, but also of the conceptually distinct area of
moral rights as embodied in VARA. VARA is the largely flawed
federal statute providing the sole source of protection for moral rights
in the United States.9
This Article relies on Kelley as a springboard to discuss certain
critical issues of copyright law and policy that, until this case, have
largely been overlooked in the discourse. The type of work at issue in
Kelley is an example of a growing subset of conceptual art composed of
plants and their soil, rather than conventional media such as canvas
and paint.10 In recent years, much has been written about creativity
theory and its implications for copyright law." In particular, this
Article focuses on how a subset of Jewish theology (called "Jewish
Process Theology") can guide copyright law and resolve the problem
highlighted in Kelley.
Legal literature has not yet explored Process Theology in
connection with human creativity. Jewish Process Theology is an
application of Process Thought, which maintains that "reality [is]
relational" and the cosmos is "constantly interacting, constantly social,
always in process, and always dynamic." 12  According to this
conceptual framework, everything is constantly in flux. This Article
draws from the Jewish tradition's version of Process Thought to
inform copyright policy concerning how to define eligible works of
authorship and determine their appropriate scope of protection.
Part I of this Article lays the conceptual groundwork by
discussing Jewish Process Theology. It demonstrates why this
philosophy provides a particularly appropriate framework for
7. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A.
8. See id. § 101 (defining "a work of visual art"); Kelley, 635 F.3d at 291, 306.
9. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A; ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY:
FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES 27 (2010).
10. See Charles Cronin, Dead on the Vine: Living and Conceptual Art and VARA, 12
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 209, 227 (2010). Cronin notes that Conceptual art "is a loosely defined
genre of works in which the artist's underlying concept or idea is more important to the ultimate
meaning and worth ascribed to the work than is a particular material rendering of it." Id. at 225.
11. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1151 (2007); Gregory N. Mandel, Left-Brain Versus Right-Braia: Competing Conceptions
of Creativity in Intellectual Property Law, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 283 (2010); Gregory N. Mandel,
To Promote the Creative Process: Intellectual Property Law and the Psychology of Creativity, 86
Notre Dame L. Rev. 1999 (2011).
12. Bradley Shavit Artson, Ba-derekh: On the Way-A Presentation of Process Theology,
62 CONSERVATIVE JUDAISM 3, 8 (2010).
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contemplating human creativity. Part II explores the challenges to
the copyright landscape presented by works of authorship that change
over time. The types of works of authorship falling under this
category extend beyond the living garden at issue in Kelley. This Part
demonstrates that the issue of change and authorship is more
important now than ever before, given how the digital age is
revolutionizing the way we think about authorship. Part III discusses
these issues in the related but distinct context of moral rights. This
Part reveals that the prevailing limited view of authorship is
particularly troublesome when the issue is not economic protection,
but rather protection for the integrity of the work as a whole.
The goal of this Article is not prescriptive. Rather, it seeks to
introduce a relevant interdisciplinary concept into the discourse and
to use this perspective to illustrate the basic point that. copyright
policy and law must address more directly how to define and apply
authorship. This Article suggests that the law needs to rethink some
of the .fundamental assumptions it has historically maintained
concerning what types of. works it ought to protect, and how it should
calibrate the scope of protection.
I. THE IMPLICATIONS OF JEWISH PROCESS THEOLOGY FOR CREATIVITY
THEORY
Process Thought is a methodology that seeks to integrate and
reconcile diverse facets of human experience-such as the ethical,
religious, aesthetic, and scientific realms-into a "coherent
explanatory scheme." 13 Grounded in the metaphysical system of
Albert North Whiteheadl 4 and others, 15 Process Thought emphasizes
the developmental essence of reality and the state of becoming rather
than the stasis of human existence. According to the Center for
Process Studies:
The particular character of every event, and consequently the world, is the result of a
selective process where the relevant past is creatively brought together to become that
new event. Reality is conceived as a process of creative advance in which many past
13. What Is Process Thought?, CENTER FOR PROCESS STUD., http://www.ctr4process.org/
about/process (last visited Feb. 23, 2012).
14. See generally ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, PROCESS AND REALITY: AN ESSAY IN
COSMOLOGY (1978).
15. See, e.g., HAROLD J. MOROWITZ, THE EMERGENCE OF EVERYTHING: HOW THE WORLD
BECAME COMPLEX (2004); JOEL R. PRIMACK & NANCY ELLEN ABRAMS, THE VIEW FROM THE
CENTER OF THE UNIVERSE (2006); BRIAN SWIMME & THOMAS BERRY, THE UNIVERSE STORY: FROM
THE PRIMORDIAL FLARING FORTH TO THE ECozoIC ERA-A CELEBRATION OF THE UNFOLDING OF
THE COSMOS (1994).
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events are integrated in the events of the present, and in turn are taken up by future
events. 16
In the scholarly arena, the most common applications of Process
Thought are in philosophy17 and theology18.19
This Part concentrates on those aspects of Jewish Process
Theology that can inform the understanding of human creativity. The
essence of Process Thought is that all of creation is constantly in
process-always dynamic, and always in motion. Rabbi Professor
Bradley Artson, who has written about the connection between
Process Thought and Jewish theology, 20 offers the following
explanation of this perspective:
We and the rest of creation are not static substances. We-and everything that
exists-are events. To grasp our nature scientifically, we must simultaneously embrace
different levels of being, despite our propensity, when we think of ourselves, to focus on
our conscious level. But our multi-layered reality complicates any simple self-identity.
If we think about humans also as collections of atoms, those atoms do not know when
they are part of a particular person and when they are part of the air around us, or
16. What Is Process Thought?, supra note 13.
17. See WHITEHEAD, supra note 14; see generally William S. Hamrick, A Process View of
the Flesh: Whitehead and Merleau-Ponty, 28 PROCESS STUD. 117 (1999); Mark C. Modak-Truran,
Prolegomena to a Process Theory of Natural Law, in 1 HANDBOOK OF WHITEHEADIAN PROCESS
THOUGHT 507 (Michel Weber & Will Desmond eds., 2008); Anne Fairchild Pomeroy, Process
Philosophy and the Possibility of Critique, 15 J. SPECULATIVE PHIL. 33 (2001); Daniel D.
Williams, Moral Obligation in Process Philosophy, 56 J. PHIL. 263 (1959).
18. See generally Artson, supra note 12; J.E. Barnhart, Incarnation and Process
Philosophy, 2 RELIGIOUS STUD. 225 (1967); James Goss, Camus, God, and Process Thought, 4
PROCESS STUD. 114 (1974); David Ray Griffin, Process Philosophy of Religion, 50 INT'L J. FOR
PHIL. RELIGION 131 (2001); Bernard M. Loomer, Christian Faith and Process Philosophy, 29 J.
RELIGION 181 (1949).
19. What Is Process Thought?, supra note 13.
20. Artson, supra note 12. A detailed exploration of Jewish Process Theology outside of
the topic of human creativity is beyond the scope of this Article, but a few words about Artson's
overall thesis are useful. He describes Process Theology as "a constellation of ideas sharing the
common assertion that the world and God are in continuous, dynamic change, of related
interaction and becoming." Id. at 3. From a theological standpoint, those who embrace Process
Thought within the Jewish religion believe it offers "the opportunity to sandblast the
philosophical overlay of ancient Greece and medieval Europe off the rich, burnished grain" of
Torah and Rabbinics "so that we can savor the actual patterns in the living word of religion ...
and appreciate Judaism for what it was intended to be and truly is." Id. at 4. Artson argues that
despite the Jewish tradition's tendency to portray God as "immutable, impassible, omnipotent,
and omniscient," the vision of God in the Torah and the Talmud evidences "portrayals of an
engaged, relating, interacting God." Id. at 6-7. In his view, "Process Thinking offers a way to
recover a biblically and rabbinically resonant, dynamic articulation of God" that meshes "with
contemporary scientific knowledge of the cosmos and of life." Id. at 8. Indeed, the Covenant,
which represents the foundational relationship between Jews and God, exemplifies Process
Thought in that, like the cosmos, it "is always interactive, always connecting, and always
relational." Id. He also discusses Revelation, "chosenness," evil, suffering and the afterlife from
the standpoint of Jewish Process Theology. See id. at 22-31. Rabbi Artson is writing about
Process Theology from the perspective of a Conservative rabbi. For a Reform rabbi's
perspective, see Toba Spitzer, Why We Need Process Theology, 59 CCAR J.: Reform Jewish Q. 84
(2012).
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when they are part of nearby objects. They float in and out of what we think of as "us"
all the time. . . . [Wie are not stable substances at all. We are constantly engaging in a
give-and-take with the rest of creation, all simultaneously. We are immediately
connected to all that came before us, up until this very instant, and with all that exists
at this very moment. Each of us immediately contains in ourselves everything that has
led to each of us.
2 1
Significantly, Artson invokes Process Thought to emphasize that God's
nature is fluid and dynamic: "The details of [His] creating-once we
move away from the abstract to the concrete-are always incomplete,
in process, on the way."22 According to Process Thought, "God is to be
found in the fact that a universe that is established through fixed,
changeless laws still generates novelty all the time: new
unprecedented things that did not previously exist."23
Artson's application of Process Thought in connection with the
Creation is steeped in both current scientific thinking as well as
Biblical and rabbinic perspectives. Like most Process thinkers, his
view of Creation reflects a developmental perspective rather than
being characterized by a moment in time when God began to create. 24
Drawing from the second verse in the Book of Genesis stating "the
earth being unformed and void, with darkness over the surface of the
deep and a wind from God sweeping over the water,"25 Artson reads
the Creation narrative contextually rather than literally. He sees
Divine Creation as "not necessarily one of instantiating ex nihilo from
without, but rather a process of mobilizing continuous self-creativity
from within."26 He demonstrates that a number of other Jewish
sources reflect this "richer view of continuous creation,"27 beginning
with the very first line in Genesis that translates to "[w]hen God
began to create heaven and earth."28 This imagery acknowledges that
God's spirit hovered over the preexisting chaos. 29
Moreover, Artson argues that Creation is not a one-time event.
On the contrary, the Talmud states that God "renews every day the
work of creation."30 Further, the cosmos is a partner in its own
creation. This concept is a bit esoteric, but one can best understand it
as a belief that Creation contains an element of internal power in that
21. Artson, supra note 12, at 8-9 (footnotes omitted).
22. Id. at 11.
23. Id. at 12.
24. See id. at 17-22.
25. ETZ HAYIM: TORAH AND COMMENTARY 4 (David L. Lieber et al. eds., Jewish Publ'n
Soc'y trans., 2001) [hereinafter ETZ HAYIM] (corresponding to Genesis 1:2).
26. Artson, supra note 12, at 17.
27. Id. at 17-18.
28. ETZ HAYIm, supra note 25, at 3 (corresponding to Genesis 1:1).
29. See Artson, supra note 12, at 18.
30. Babylonian Talmud, Hagigah 12b.
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the universe is "co-creating"31: "It is not that God, once and for all,
speaks everything that currently lives into existence from the
outside."32 Rather, "God coaxes, summons, and invites" each stage of
Creation to materialize. 33  In other words, Artson understands
Creation as an invitation from God "into the process of becoming."34
Artson acknowledges that his articulated theory of Creation
may be disconcerting for those who understand the Old Testament
through "dominant theological lenses," but he also demonstrates how
the sources in the Jewish tradition can accommodate the insights of
Process Thought. 35  Artson's theory of the Divine Essence and
Creation also has significant implications for how the Jewish tradition
understands human creativity. According to Rabbi Joseph
Soloveitchik, a leading modern authority on Jewish law, the Torah
chose to relate to man "the tale of creation" so that man could derive
the law that God obligates humans to create. 36 Thus, the Jewish
religion introduced to the world that "[t]he most fundamental
principle of all is that man must create himself."37 The rabbinic
literature provides that "[a]ll that was created during the six days of
creation requires improvement."38 Moreover, it is man's function to
partner with God in creating an improved world and to renew the
cosmos with his creative enterprise. 39  Another early rabbinic
narrative involving a dialogue between the great Talmudic Sage
Akibah and the evil governor of the Judean province, Tinius Rufus,
also expresses this fundamental concept.40 Rufus challenged Akibah
by asking whether the work of God or man is more beautiful.41
Akibah replied that man's work is better with respect to those things
where his art is effective (as opposed to those matters such as the
creation of heaven and earth which man cannot imitate).42 Pressing
further, Rufus asked why male babies are not already born
31. Artson, supra note 12, at 19.
32. Id. at 18.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 19.
35. See id. at 20-22.
36. JOSEPH B. SOLOVEITCHIK, HALAKHIC MAN 101 (Lawrence Kaplan trans., 1983).
According to Soloveitchik, "[tihe peak of religious ethical perfection to which Judaism aspires is
man as creator." Id.
37. Id. at 109.
38. Genesis Rabbah 11:6.
39. See SOLOVEITCHIK, supra note 36, at 81. According to Jewish law, man was not
intended to be a passive recipient of the Torah, but rather "a partner with the Almighty in the
act of creation." Id.
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circumcised and Akibah replied they do not come out already
circumcised because God gave the commandments in order to refine
the people of Israel. 43
According to this perspective, "[t]he cosmos is a partner with
God in its own becoming" and humans "are partners with the cosmos
and with God in our own becoming."44 Thus, since Jewish Process
Theology understands man as having the choice whether or not to do
God's will, God is reaffirmed as "a dynamic, relating God who suffers,
a God who becomes vulnerable in having created us."4 5 The imagery
about Noah and the Great Flood is an expression of this fundamental
concept; the text in Genesis recounts that God experienced "heartfelt
sadness."46  Rashi, the celebrated eleventh-century French biblical
commentator, explains this phrase as meaning that God, in preparing
for the Flood, "mourned over the destruction of His handiwork."47 The
sense of relation-of "a dynamic interconnection between God,
humanity, and all creation"-lies at the heart of Jewish Process
Theology in its vision of how God and man relate to one another. 48
The way in which humans partner with and relate to God
according to Jewish Process Theology has important implications for
human creative enterprise. A traditional Jewish approach to artistic
creation emphasizes that the underlying motivations for physical
creative action are rooted in the concept of mirroring the Divine. 49
The Creation narrative in Genesis states: "God created man in His
image, in the image of God He created him."50 God commanded man
to "fill the earth and master it."51 Through this language, the text
illustrates that man's capacity for artistic creation mirrors or imitates
God's creative capacity. 52 Soloveitchik has argued that the term
"image of God" as used in this narrative underscores "man's striving
43. Id.
44. Artson, supra note 12, at 9.
45. Id. at 14.
46. THE CHUMASH: THE TORAH, HAFTAROS AND FIVE MEGILLOS WITH A COMMENTARY
ANTHOLOGIZED FROM THE RABBINIC WRITINGS 29 (Nosson Scherman et al. eds., Stone ed. 1993)
[hereinafter THE CHUMASH] (corresponding to Genesis 6:6).
47. RASHI, THE TORAH: WITH RASHI'S COMMENTARY TRANSLATED, ANNOTATED, AND
ELUCIDATED 62 (Yisrael Isser Zvi Herczeg et al. trans., Sapirstein ed. 1993).
48. Artson, supra note 12, at 15.




52. Cf. Mark Rose, Copyright and Its Metaphors, 50 UCLAL. REV. 1, 11 (2002) ('"[Slome
creative spark'. . . if unpacked could be shown to carry a numinous aura evocative ultimately of
the original divine act of creation itself.").
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and ability to become a creator."53 Even historians who are not
writing about the Bible from a theological perspective view this
language as furnishing a path leading man to regard himself as a
potential creator, thus underscoring an unprecedented parallel
between God and humanity. 54
Jewish theology also teaches that man's speech reflects his
creative capacity in the same way that God's speech reveals His
creative capacity.55 In describing the Divine act of Creation, the Torah
does not say that God made a world, but that He spoke the world into
existence by preceding every creative act with a statement of what He
was going to do. For example, "God said, 'Let there be light,' and there
was light."5 6  Scholars refer to these "speakings" as the "Ten
Utterances" with which, according to the text, God created the world.57
Later in Genesis, the text states that God "blew into [Adam's] nostrils
the breath of life, and man became a living being."58 The renowned
Jewish commentator Nahmanides59 interprets this passage as
meaning that God blew his own breath into Adam's nostrils.60
Scholars understand God's breath to mean "the soul of life,"6 1 thus
establishing the way in which the creation of human beings differs
from all other creations. 62 Moreover, the purpose of this special soul
was to enable man to speak and express himself.63 These vivid images
53. JOSEPH B. SOLOVEITCHIK, THE LONELY MAN OF FAITH 12 (1965).
54. DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE CREATORS: A HISTORY OF HEROES OF THE IMAGINATION 41
(1992).
55. Eliezer's Story, WK. REV., Nov. 22, 1997.
56. THE CHUMASH, supra note 46, at 3 (corresponding to Genesis 1:3).
57. See BEREL WEIN, PIRKEI Avos: TEACHINGS FOR OUR TIMES 184-85 (Birnbaum ed.
2003); see also Artson, supra note 12, at 18 ("By the end of the first chapter of Genesis, God has
spoken creation into a symphony of diverse becoming.").
58. RASHI, supra note 47, at 23-24 (corresponding to Genesis 2:7); see also YAAKOV CULI,
THE TORAH ANTHOLOGY (YALKUT ME'AM Lo'EZ): GENESIS-I 245 (Aryeh Kaplan trans., 1977); cf.
MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION 178-79 (1976) (likening authentic
speech-that which is the creative, original descriptions of feelings-to the expression of artists);
Russ VerSteeg, Defining 'Author" for Purposes of Copyright, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1323, 1339, 1365
(1996) (affirming communication as the essential component of authorship).
59. Nahmanides, who lived in the thirteenth century, is also referred to as the Ramban.
NINA CAPUTO, NAHMANIDES IN MEDIEVAL CATALONIA: HISTORY, COMMUNITY, & MESSIANISM 1
(2007), available at http://www3.undpress.nd.edulexcerpts/PO1210-ex.pdf.
60. RAMBAN (NACHMANIDES), COMMENTARY ON THE TORAH: GENESIS 66 (Charles B.
Chavel trans., 1971) [hereinafter RAMBAN]; THE CHUMASH, supra note 46, at 11 (corresponding
to Genesis 2:7); see also CULI, supra note 58.
61. CULI, supra note 58; RASHI, supra note 47, at 23.
62. According to classical Jewish belief, although man was created alive, he did not
attain his true form until God took this further step of infusing him with the soul. CULI, supra
note 58; see also RAMBAN, supra note 60 (discussing the creation of man's soul).
63. Onkelos, the Roman convert to Judaism who wrote an Aramaic translation of the
Five Books of Moses in the second century, translates the words "living being" found in the
second Creation narrative as "a speaking spirit." THE CHUMASH, supra note 46, at 11
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of how God created man to mirror Himself by using his own creative
capacities furnish a striking parallel between God's connection to man
and man's connection to his own works of creation-a "parental
metaphor of authorship."64 Again, the sense of a dynamic and
ever-changing "relationship" is what supports man's relationship to
God65 and man's relationship to the products of his own creativity.
Understanding human creativity through the lens of Jewish
Process Theology illustrates that the characteristic ingredients of both
Divine and human creativity are fluidity, partnership, and
relationship. Both creativity theory and first-hand narratives of
human creators support this description of human output. The
process of human creativity is fluid and developmental. Individual
creators attest to the "gestational period" underscoring
creativity-that timeframe in which the creative juices flow internally,
almost imperceptibly. 6 6 This inner labor-termed "the unconscious
machine" by mathematician Henri Poincar6-is what creators
underscore as the pivotal component of creativity.67 Moreover, the
testimonial narratives of creators also illustrate that creativity entails
a partnership between the author and the work itself. Bertrand
Russell emphasized "the fruitless effort he used to expend in trying to
push his creative work to completion by sheer force of will before he
discovered the necessity of waiting for it to find its own subconscious
development." 68 Author Madeleine L'Engel wrote that in order for an
artist to realize her goals, she must allow the work to take over so that
the artist can "get out of the way" and not interfere.69
Current psychological theories reinforce these author
testimonials. These theories recognize that human creativity features
an element of artistic self-transcendence among its multifaceted
components. 70  Modern scholars of creativity believe
self-transcendence is critical to the development of an artistic soul
(commenting on Genesis 2:7). Onkeles thus describes God's endowing man with the ability to
speak as the purpose of this special soul. Rashi explains that the soul of man is more alive than
the souls of animals because man's soul contains the powers of speech and reasoning. See sources
cited supra note 58.
64. KWALL, supra note 9, at 13-14.
65. In this regard, Artson has observed: "Our suffering pains God. God is diminished by
our not rising to the best choice. The God of Israel is not merely an unchanging, external
perfection (although there is an aspect of God that is unchanging and eternal); we encounter the
Divine in the dynamism of b'rit, relationship." Artson, supra note 12, at 15.
66. KWALL, supra note 9, at 12.
67. See id. (developing this point more thoroughly).
68. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
69. Id. at 17 (quoting MADELEINE L'ENGLE, WALKING ON WATER: REFLECTIONS ON
FAITH AND ART 24 (1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
70. Id. at 15.
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because it reaffirms that, to maximize creative output, an artist must
get beyond herself and become a partner with her work.71 Thus, the
renowned psychiatrist C.G. Jung observed: "The work in process
becomes the poet's fate and determines his psychic development. It is
not Goethe who creates Faust, but Faust who creates Goethe."72 The
idea that an artist must get beyond her own ego and "listen" to her
work embodies the very same partnership concept as Artson describes
in discussing God's Creation of the Universe. According to Jewish
tradition, God commands humans to mirror Him and create; thus,
humans must similarly partner with their works of authorship in
order to maximize their creative potential. Even man's need for
self-transcendence in human creativity has a parallel in Divine
creation. Recall that according to the account of Creation in Genesis,
God spoke the world into existence.73  According to the Jewish
tradition, for both God and man, speech is singularly reflective of the
ability to transcend the self and relate to someone or something else.74
The foregoing narratives reveal that the partnership
component of creativity-emphasized in Process Thought-has
relevance for any creative work because "partnership" encompasses
the idea of self-transcendence, which requires the creator to submerge
her ego and pay attention to the voice of the work itself. The idea of a
work being a "partner" in its own creation is especially relevant for
works involving random or accidental moments, or works resulting in
part from the forces of nature. Process Theology provides a valuable
way to reconcile the motivations that are reflective of an author's
intrinsic creative process with other forms of nonintentional
expression.75 Indeed, if human creativity is seen as a "partnership"
between the creator and the work, different works will fall on different
places along the partnership spectrum. Perhaps works of authorship
that the author does not create with a strong degree of intentionality
do not reflect as strong a sense of partnership as other types of works,
but they nonetheless encompass a degree of mutuality; the human
author still is allowing these "chance" or partially natural works to
emerge and develop. 76
71. Id. at 15-16.
72. Id. at 16; see also id. at 15-17 (citing further examples).
73. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
74. See Eliezer's Story, supra note 55.
75. KWALL, supra note 9, at 21.
76. This may be what Justin Hughes had in mind when he "posited that personhood
interests justifying protection of some type 'can arise from simply being the human source of an
intellectual property res."' See id. (quoting Justin Hughes, The Personality Interest of Artists and
Inventors in Intellectual Property, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 81, 83 (1998)). It appears that
Process Theology would allow for a similar description of God's creations as well. Specifically,
899
VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW
The text of Genesis also reveals that when God created the
world, He evaluated His activity at the end of each day.77 Speaking
from a Process Theology perspective, Robert Gnuse has remarked that
"the statement that God found the creative act of each specific day to
be good is highly important, for it means that at each stage of the
creative endeavor God stopped and took account of what was
unfolding."78 According to this perspective, God also functioned like
an editor who viewed and reviewed daily. This imagery underscores
both the relational and the fluid essence of Divine creativity in
keeping with Process Theology. The parallel for human creativity is
quite clear. Most human creators experience the same type of ongoing
evaluative process, resulting in works that evolve and progress.
This foray into Jewish Process Theology leads to the question
of whether any work of human creativity is ever really completed any
more than humans are considered "finished." This query poses an
interesting dilemma for copyright law in the United States. Decisions
such as Kelley exclude works from copyright's scope that manifest
fluidity and incorporate elements other than an author's direct
intentionality. Part II explores further the nature of this problem.
II. APPLYING PROCESS THEOLOGY TO AUTHORSHIP AND FIXATION
Artist Chapman Kelley's experience illustrates the nature of
the problem regarding copyright law as applied to ongoing or fluid
works. Chapman Kelley creates representational paintings of
landscapes and flowers.79 In 1984, he installed Wildflower Works in
Chicago's Grant Park.80 The Seventh Circuit described his work as
"two enormous elliptical flowerbeds, each nearly as big as a football
field, featuring a variety of native wildflowers and edged with borders
of gravel and steel."81 Kelley promoted the work as "living art" and it
was widely acclaimed on both a critical and popular level. 8 2 Kelley,
along with a group of volunteers, tended the garden, pruned and
replanted it as needed.83 In 2004, however, the Chicago Park District
Process Theology would contend that to the extent that man accepts God's invitation to
participate in ways that represent good choices, man reflects the Godly part of himself and his
mutual partnership; to the extent man makes bad choices and rejects God's invitation, he asserts
his individuality in negative ways. See Artson, supra note 12, at 14-15.
77. Genesis 1:4, 10, 12, 18, 21, 25.
78. ROBERT K. GNUSE, THE OLD TESTAMENT AND PROCESS THEOLOGY 102 (2000).




82. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
83. Id.
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drastically modified the garden, reduced it to less than half its original
size, changed some of the material, and reconfigured the flowerbeds.84
Kelley sued the Park District for violating his moral right of integrity
under VARA.85
The district court did not grant Kelley his requested relief. The
court held that viewers could consider his work as both a painting and
a sculpture under VARA, and therefore it met the statutory
requirements of a work of visual art under VARA. 86 Oddly, however,
the court denied relief to Kelley on the ground that the work also
lacked sufficient originality for the law to consider it copyrightable
under the copyright statute.87 The district court's ruling in this regard
was completely flawed because VARA cannot protect works if they do
not otherwise qualify for copyright protection.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit cast doubt upon the district
court's conclusions that Wildflower Works qualified for protection
under VARA and that it failed copyright's originality test. 8
Ultimately, however, the appellate court affirmed the district court's
ruling on the ground that the work did not manifest the requisite
expressive authorship and fixation and, therefore, was not
copyrightable.89  The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently denied
certiorari in the case, thus foreclosing the opportunity to revisit the
significant implications of the decision.90 This Part examines and
critiques more closely the authorship and fixation aspects of the
Seventh Circuit's decision in light of the Process Theology discussion
in Part I above.
84. Id.
85. Id.; see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
86. Kelley, 635 F.3d at 292.
87. Id. The VARA aspect of the decision also included an issue concerning site-specific
art. The district court concluded that Kelley's work was site-specific art and therefore, following
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit's opinion in Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc.,
it was also categorically excluded from protection under VARA. Id. at 291; see also Phillips v.
Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128, 128 (1st Cir. 2006). Given the Seventh Circuit's
disposition on the "copyrightability" of Wildflower Works, it did not need to address the issue of
whether the work was site-specific art and the impact of this determination. Kelley, 635 F.3d at
306. The appellate court did appear to accept the work's classification as site-specific art. Id.
Nevertheless, it questioned the district court's conclusion that as such, it is categorically
excluded from protection under VARA. See id. at 306-07. The case also involved a breach of
contract claim on which the district court ruled in favor of Kelley but awarded nominal damages
in the amount of $1.00. Id. The Seventh Circuit reversed on the breach of contract claim, thus
holding that the Park District was entitled to prevail in this matter. Id. at 308. This Article does
not address either the site-specific art or the contract claim issues.
88. Kelley, 635 F.3d at 292.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 306-07.
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The court correctly held that in order to qualify for moral rights
protection under VARA, a work must first satisfy basic copyright
requirements.91 Almost everywhere, moral rights apply to works that
are copyrightable, or in the context of civil law systems, to works that
are capable of giving rise to economic rights. 92 Copyright statutes of
particular countries typically contain moral rights, as is the case in
the United States.93  Thus, the district court's conclusion that
Wildflower Works qualified as a work of visual art under VARA but
lacked originality under copyright law simply made no sense. The
appellate court correctly recognized this flaw in the lower court's
opinion.94 It did not evince concern about whether Wildflower Works
satisfied the. relatively low standard for originality under copyright
law. 9 5 Instead, the Seventh Circuit stated that "[t]he real impediment
to copyright here is not that Wildflower Works fails the test for
originality. .:. but that a living garden lacks the kind of authorship
and stable fixation normally required to support copyright."96
Interestingly, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that
"copyright's prerequisites of authorship and fixation are broadly
defined."97 Still, the Seventh Circuit appeared to ground its objections
to the copyrightability of Wildflower Works on two somewhat related
rationales: 1) the work is "alive and inherently changeable, not fixed,"
and 2) the work lacks human authorship because its appearance
depends on the forces of nature.98 Moreover, the work's changeability
appears to be attributable to nonhuman forces of nature that,
according to the court, are primarily responsible for shaping the
garden's appearance. Since the court understood authorship as "an
entirely human endeavor,"99 it posited that "works owing their form to
the forces of nature cannot be copyrighted."100  Also, the court
observed that "a garden is simply too changeable to satisfy the
primary purpose of fixation; its appearance is too inherently variable
to supply a baseline for determining questions of copyright creation
and infringement."101 The court was obviously troubled with issues of
proof and perceived practicality:
91. Id. at 299.
92. Id. at 296.
93. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006); KWALL, supra note 9, at 40.
94. Kelley, 635 F.3d at 299 ("VARA supplements general copyright protection. . .
95. Id. at 303.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 304.
98. Id.
99. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 304-05.
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If a garden can qualify as a "work of authorship" sufficiently "embodied in a copy," at
what point has fixation occurred? When the garden is newly planted? When its first
blossoms appear? When it is in full bloom? How-and at what point in time-is a court
to determine whether infringing copying has occurred?
10 2
According to the court's definition of authorship, the scope of copyright
protection excludes that which is in a state of perpetual change, given
the fixation requirement.103 The fact that the garden's "nature is one
of dynamic change"104 means that copyright protection fails.
The Seventh Circuit distinguished Wildflower Works from
other examples of copyrighted works that are not entirely fixed or
stable.105 It therefore acknowledged that copyright does not attach
"only to works that are static or fully permanent" and denied "that
artists who incorporate natural or living elements in their work can
never claim copyright." 06 In acknowledging the possibility that some
changeable works can qualify for protection, the court leaves the
copyright window open to include some types of works that are less
traditionally stable.
In sum, the Seventh Circuit couched its first objection to the
copyrightability of Wildflower Works on the dual grounds of lack of
fixation and the work's inherent fluidity; it based its second objection
on the contribution of nonhuman elements to the work. Despite the
court's analysis, the fixation and inherent fluidity components of the
court's first objection present two distinct issues that should be
addressed separately. Once the parameters of both of these elements
are more properly understood, this Article introduces the relevance of
Process Theology as Part I discusses above. Process Theology can also
facilitate a dialogue concerning the issue of nonhuman authorship
upon which the court's second objection hinges.
A. Fixation and the Writing Requirement
In Kelley, the Seventh Circuit observed that "fixation" is an
explicit constitutional requirement in light of the use of the term
102. Id. at 305.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. (distinguishing Wildflower Works from the Crown Fountain, a sculpture whose
surfaces "are embedded with LED screens that replay recorded video images of the faces of 1,000
Chicagoans," on the basis that "the Copyright Act specifically contemplates works that
incorporate or consist of sounds or images that are broadcast or transmitted electronically, such
as telecasts of sporting events or other live performances, video games, and the like"). The court
also distinguished Wildflower Works from a puppy-shaped metal sculpture covered in blooming
flowers, because "[Wildflower Works] is quintessentially a garden; 'Puppy' is not." Id. at 306.
106. Id. at 305.
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"writings" in the Copyright Clause. 107  Nevertheless, the original
meaning of this term is not clear:
The constitutional grant of authority concerning copyrights does not require Congress to
act with respect to all categories of materials that may meet the constitutional
definitions. Instead, "whether any specific category of 'Writings' is to be brought within
the purview of the federal statutory scheme is left to the discretion of Congress." In
discussing the term writings in this context in 1879, the Supreme Court in the
Trademark Cases stated that the writings that are to be protected are the "fruits of
intellectual labor." Moreover, in Goldstein v. California, the Supreme Court emphasized
that the "history of federal copyright statutes indicates that the congressional
determination to consider specific classes of writings is dependent, not only on the
character of the writing, but also on the commercial importance of the product to the
national economy."
10 8
Based on this rationale, "the tremendous impact of commercial
celebrity endorsements on our consumer culture ... provides
additional support for recognizing celebrity personas as within the
scope of 'writings' within the meaning of the Copyright Clause."109 If
the national importance of any given product is a factor to consider in
whether a particular work qualifies as a "writing," the positive
environmental impact of Wildflower Works should also be a factor. 110
Thus understood, the constitutional requirement of a "writing" may be
seen as encompassing a concern with appropriate copyrightable
subject matter.
Thus, the 1976 Act's concept of "fixation" is not necessarily
coterminous with the Constitutional predicate of a "writing."111 As
discussed, the Constitution's "writing" requirement may stem from a
107. Id. at 303 ("Unlike originality, authorship and fixation are explicit constitutional
requirements; the Copyright Clause empowers Congress to secure for 'authors' exclusive rights
in their 'writings."' (citing U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 8)).
108. KWALL, supra note 9, at 111-12 (citations omitted).
109. Id. at 112.
110. According to the court in Kelley, "[iun promoting Wildflower Works, Kelley variously
described the project as a 'living wildflower painting,' a 'study on wildflower landscape and
management,' and 'a new vegetative management system that beautifies [the] landscape
economically with low-maintenance wildflowers."' Kelley, 635 F.3d at 300 (second alteration in
original).
111. See Laura A. Heymann, How to Write a Life: Some Thoughts on Fixation and the
Copyright/Privacy Divide, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 844-46, 853 (2009) (providing a similar
argument on this point). Heymann's thesis is that the fixation requirement represents not a
Constitutional mandate but rather "a deliberate decision on the part of Congress to afford
protection only to certain types of artistic endeavors-those that can be propertized and thus
subject to the economic incentives at the heart of copyright law." Id. at 849. It is also significant
that the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, which the United
States joined in 1988, gives participating countries the option to include a fixation requirement
in their copyright laws. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
art. 2(2), Sept. 9, 1886, 1161 U.N.T.S. 30 ("It shall, however, be a matter for legislation in the
countries of the Union to prescribe that works in general or any specified categories of works
shall not be protected unless they have been fixed in some material form.").
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concern with subject matter,112 whereas the statutory requirement
that a copyrightable work be "fixed in any tangible medium of
expression" 113 arguably embodies a concern for proof in infringement
situations. 114 Specifically, the fixation requirement provides notice to
the public of exactly what falls within the scope of the copyright, and
in this way functions to "mark off' the protected work. The Seventh
Circuit in Kelley clearly recognized this purpose by articulating
concern regarding when a fluid work is deemed "fixed" for purposes of
demonstrating infringement.11 5 In discussing the statutory language
of the 1976 Act, the House Report stated that "it makes no difference
what the form, manner, or medium of fixation may be."116 Wildflower
Works is capable of being "fixed" in ways such as videotape or
photography, which would satisfy the statute's explicit fixation
requirement. 117
Fixation can occur at various stages of a work's development;
therefore, courts should not conflate this issue with the fluid nature of
a given work. Indeed, the definitional section of the Copyright Act
provides that a work is created when it is fixed in a copy or
phonorecord for the first time; "where a work is prepared over a period
of time, the portion of it that has been fixed at any particular time
constitutes the work as of that time, and where the work has been
prepared in different versions, each version constitutes a separate
work."118 As the copyright statute itself recognizes, works evolve over
a period of time, and the statute does not intend to require that a work
112. See supra note 110.
113. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
114. See 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:22 (2012) (suggesting that
fixation eases "problems of proof of creation and infringement").
115. See Kelley, 635 F.3d at 304-05.
116. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 52 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5665.
117. For a work to be fixed, the Copyright Act requires that it be "sufficiently permanent
or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more
than transitory duration." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added). The scope of this durational
requirement has been the subject of much litigation, especially in the age of digital copyright
infringement. See Cartoon Network, LLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 130 (2d Cir. 2008)
(holding that data stored for 1.2 seconds in a cable company's Broadband Media Router was not
sufficiently fixed so as to constitute a "copy"); CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544,
551 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that an Internet Service Provider could not be held liable for direct
copyright infringement when its servers were used to upload infringing photographs because its
servers were mere conduits for transmission and "[wihile temporary electronic copies may be
made in this transmission process, they would appear not to be 'fixed' in the sense that they are
'of more than transitory duration"'); Mai Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518
(9th Cir. 1993) (holding that loading a computer program into RAM constituted fixation because
it was capable of being perceived by computer technicians for diagnostic purposes). See generally
Aaron Perzanowski, Fixing RAM Copies, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. 1067 (2010) (providing an in-depth
discussion of this issue).
118. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).
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be "frozen" at any given point in time in order to pass constitutional
muster.119
There may be some types of fluid works for which fixation can
be problematic. Performance art, which interacts directly with the
viewer and the exhibition space, comes to mind because its very
essence depends upon constant and significant degrees of fluidity from
one performance to another. Thus, a "fixed" version of one
performance would likely not be able to satisfy the fixation
requirement for a subsequent performance that is very different from
the previously fixed version. As discussed below, however, not all
works that are characterized by a sense of fluidity present the same
challenges for fixation.
Process Theology emphasizes that everything changes over
time. This reality of change supports the idea that, although a court
should take into account the degree of fluidity of a given work in
determining its copyrightability, the presence of fluidity should not, in
and of itself, act as a bar to copyright protection based on the work's
inability to satisfy the fixation requirement. Therefore, this Article
recommends incorporating a standard of "substantial compliance" for
satisfying the fixation requirement. This standard would entitle a
particular fixed version of a work to protection not only for itself, but
also for other works, provided only minimal differences exist between
the prior fixed work and subsequent versions. This standard could be
useful for works with certain degrees of fluidity. For example, if a
given performance artist typically introduces minimal variations into
her work from day to day, the fixation of one performance could satisfy
fixation of the work generally under this substantial compliance
standard for fixation.
Moreover, the film of any given performance would satisfy the
Constitution's requirement of a "writing" under this approach. The
copyright statute already evinces this approach to fixation by
119. Cf. Heymann, supra note 111, at 858-59 (critiquing the fixation requirement on the
ground that "when creators seek to avail themselves of copyright protection, they must choose a
particular performance or creative output that becomes the fixed work"). With respect to
copyrighted Internet websites, the Copyright Office has taken the position that "copyrightable
revisions to online works that are published on separate days must each be registered
individually." See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 66: COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION FOR ONLINE
WORKS 2 (2009). According to the Amicus Brief filed by the Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts and
the Arts & Business Council of Greater Boston, although
this statement suggests that the registration of a particular website at a particular
moment covers only that iteration of the website, it demonstrates that works in a
constant state of change-even if change is known and expected at the moment of
registration-are still undoubtedly fixed for purposes of the fixation requirement of
the Copyright Act.
Brief for Blane De St. Croix et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 13, Kelley v. Chi.
Park Dist., 132 S. Ct. 380 (2011) (No. 11-101) [hereinafter Brief for Blane De St. Croix].
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extending its protection to choreography, which is explicitly protected
under the statute.120 Choreography satisfies the fixation requirement
through videotape or film. 12 1 Yet, any given performance of a dance
will vary from time to time. In much the same way, works such as
Wildflower Works could satisfy the fixation requirement through a
written document with a detailed plan for what the garden would
entail-very similar to architectural plans that are also protected
under copyright law. 122 The fact that the precise contents of the
garden may change from time to time thus does not force the garden
outside the bounds of copyright law.123 Under this approach, the real
issue would come down to the question of the extent to which the
fluidity of a given work excludes protection on subject matter grounds,
not due to lack of fixation.
B. Fluidity and Process Theology
The foregoing discussion has argued that satisfaction of the
fixation requirement, as a concept distinct from the fluidity of a given
work, should not be an insurmountable obstacle for most works of
authorship. Assuming, therefore, that a given work can satisfy the
fixation requirement, the question remains how to address the issue of
fluidity. The court in Kelley was concerned about the degree of fluidity
of Wildflower Works and used this as a basis to bar it from copyright
protection. 124 In approaching this issue, it is useful to consider the law
concerning copyright protection for other types of works that may
evolve over time. Fictional characters represent an interesting
example of this genre. The copyright statute does not contain express
protection for fictional characters, and commentators have differed in
their views regarding whether such protection is appropriate.125
120. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(4).
121. See generally Anne K. Weinhardt, Note, Copyright Infringement of Choreography:
The Legal Aspects of Fixation, 13 J. CORP. L. 839, 850 (1988).
122. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(8).
123. Cf. Heymann, supra note 111, at 854 ("There is no requirement that the first
fixation of the work (the 'original') exist in any form at the time of the infringement or the
litigation; indeed, the post-creation destruction of the original fixation does not affect the status
of the copyright in the work at all.").
124. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
125. Compare David B. Feldman, Comment, Finding a Home for Fictional Characters: A
Proposal for Change in Copyright Protection, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 687, 720 (1990) (arguing that
fictional characters should be expressly protected by the Copyright Act because courts often
confuse the "copyrightability" inquiry with the infringement inquiry when characters are at
issue), with Leslie A. Kurtz, The Independent Legal Lives of Fictional Characters, 1986 WIs. L.
REV. 429, 460 (acknowledging that fictional characters should be copyrightable, but arguing that
courts should analyze character infringement cases in terms of the similarities between the
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In addressing the question of literary characters specifically,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit devised a rigorous
testl2 6 requiring that such characters were only protected if they
"constitute[d] the story being told."127 However, neither the case nor
subsequent interpretations of the test invoked by the court have been
clear on what the "story being told" test means.12s A reasonable
interpretation is that literary characters only receive protection to the
extent that they embody the story to such a degree that the
copyrightable story and the character itself become one. The law
seems to reflect a requirement that characters be sufficiently
delineated in order to receive copyright protection.129 Still, this legal
position ignores the reality that, no matter how delineated a given
character may be-either physically or through a word
portrait-characters change and develop over time and often take
shape over the course of several works. The fact that a character may
be delineated one way at one point in time does not mean that it
becomes "fixed" forever in this format; looks can change and so can
personalities. Some courts have demonstrated a willingness to protect
the personality traits of fictional and graphic characters that are
sufficiently distinctive to merit protection.130  This willingness to
protect characters' personality traits, which are fluid by their very
infringed and allegedly infringing characters rather than the copyrightability of the protected
character).
126. Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, 1165 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (arguing that the
Ninth Circuit's test for infringement of literary characters, as set forth in Warner Bros. v.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., is more rigorous than that of the Second Circuit, as set
forth in Nichols v. Universal Pictures).
127. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. (Sam Spade), 216 F.2d
945, 950 (9th Cir. 1954).
128. The only guidance provided by the Warner Brothers court with respect to the
application of "the story being told" test is that "if the character is only the chessman in the game
of telling the story he is not within the area of the protection afforded by the copyright." Id.; see
also Anderson, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1166 ("Air Pirates can be interpreted as either attempting to
harmonize granting copyright protection to graphic characters with the 'story being told' test
enunciated in the Sam Spade case or narrowing the 'story being told' test to characters in
literary works.").
129. Anderson, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1166 ("This Court has no difficulty ruling as a matter of
law that the Rocky characters are delineated so extensively that they are protected from bodily
appropriation when taken as a group and transposed into a sequel by another author.").
130. See, e.g., Halicki Films, LLC v. Sanderson Sales & Mktg., 547 F.3d 1213, 1213 (9th
Cir. 2008) (recognizing protection for the physical and conceptual qualities of the character
Eleanor the automobile); Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 662 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that an
otherwise stock comic book character's "speech" and other "expressive content" ultimately
contributed to its being copyrightable); Warner Bros. Inc. v. American Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231,
243 (2d Cir. 1983) (examining both physical and personality traits of fictional superhero
characters at issue); Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 607 (7th
Cir. 1982) (holding that the video game K.C. Munchkin infringed upon PACMAN's copyright
based not only on graphic similarities but also on similarities in the characters' portrayal).
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nature, underscores the judiciary's overall comfort in dealing with
copyright matters involving works that change.
Thus, as both Process Thought and copyright law's concern
with characters illustrate, change is a fact of life. Indeed, "all works of
art succumb to the forces of nature and change over time."131 A
system of copyright protection that fails to consider the relevance of
fluidity of works of authorship is out of step with how creation occurs
in theory and in practice. Perhaps because of the fixation requirement
in the United States, the "lore" of copyright law tends to assume
stability of eligible works. This narrative of copyright law is far less
reflective of reality than society might otherwise think, especially in a
digital era when change is so easily accomplished. Professor Margaret
Chon has studied the Chain Art project, one interesting example of
fluidity in the digital era. 132 This work was a collaborationist category
of visual digital art housed on a website for which its design and its
execution "depended on the deliberate changing by many authors of a
single author's original image." 13 3 Moreover, the case law involving
video games presents another genre of copyrightable works for which
content is subject to variability.134 These examples underscore the
fluidity that is often characteristic of the growing number of digital
works of authorship.
Courts should view the issue of eligibility for copyright
protection as distinct from how to prove infringement of fluid works in
the context of an actual case. In Anderson v. Stallone, a case involving
copyright protection for the Rocky movie characters, the court quoted
Nimmer on Copyright for the proposition that the question whether
characters are copyrightable is "more properly framed [in terms of] . . .
131. Brief for Blane De St. Croix, supra note 119, at 7. An interesting-and perhaps
extreme-illustration of this point is furnished by Christo's "Running Fence," which consists of
an 18-foot tall "fence" composed of white nylon fabric, "stretched over 24.5 miles of undulating
hillside terrain, where the appearance of the fence was affected by wind and light." DAVID LANGE
ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS 863 (3d ed. 2007).
132. Margaret Chon, New Wine Bursting from Old Bottles: Collaborative Internet Art,
Joint Works, and Entrepreneurship, 75 OR. L. REV. 257, 266 (1996).
133. Id. Chon also observed that "the notion of fluidity ... is so crucial to a networked
environment." Id. at 270.
134. See, e.g., M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 433 (4th Cir. 1986) ("Even
though 'audiovisual works' are proper subjects for copyright, the actual copyrighting of such
audiovisual works and their qualifying for copyright protection depends on whether the works
meet the tests for originality and fixation . . . ."); Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d
870, 873-74 (3d Cir. 1982) (rejecting the argument that video game graphics are "transient" and
therefore not fixed for purposes of copyright protection); Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d
852, 852 (2d Cir. 1982) (affirming the copyrightability of video games despite variability of
images on the screen depending on actions of a given player); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider,
543 F. Supp 466, 480 (D. Neb. 1981) (holding that Plaintiffs coin-operated video games, an
"audiovisual work," were fixed in printed circuit boards-"tangible objects from which the
audiovisual works may be perceived for a period of time more than transitory").
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the degree of substantial similarity required to constitute
infringement rather than in terms of copyrightability per se." 135
Likely, the court meant that since characters are not explicitly
protected by copyright law, other courts can only determine the extent
to which copyright law protects characters in the context of an overall
infringement inquiry with respect to the work in which the character
appears.136
Significantly, an approach that embraces fluidity as a
characteristic of copyrightable subject matter is more consistent with
the practice of artistic creativity and the belief that change is
inevitable. The underlying theories of Process Thought and Theology
illuminate this belief. Once the law accepts that fluidity does not
necessarily preclude copyright protection, the subject matter issue
should depend on whether a given work constitutes an "original work
of authorship" as copyright law requires. 137 Moreover, if copyright law
protects fluid works, the extent to which courts will protect them in
practice depends on how similar an allegedly infringing work appears
to the work being infringed.
Copyright law contains precedent for this approach with
respect to less conventionally expressive subject matter. For example,
in Kregos v. Associated Press, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs selection of baseball statistics in
a particular form embodied sufficient originality and creativity as a
matter of law to support a denial of summary judgment to the
defendant in a copyright infringement action. 138  Still, the court
warned the plaintiff that if he prevailed at trial regarding the
originality and creativity requirements for copyright protection, he
would only be able to obtain copyright protection commensurate with
the type of work at issue. 139 Ultimately, the defendant's competing
compilation escaped liability because the court determined that its
selection of statistics was sufficiently different from that of the
135. Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, 1167 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (quoting 1-2
MELVILLE NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.12 (2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
136. See generally Feldman, supra note 125.
137. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
138. Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 704 (2d Cir. 1991) ("It cannot be said as a
matter of law that in selecting the nine items for his pitching form out of the universe of
available data, Kregos has failed to display enough selectivity to satisfy the requirement of
originality.").
139. Id. at 709 ("If Kregos prevails at trial on the factual issues of originality and
creativity, he will be entitled to protection only against infringement of the protectable features
of his form."). Specifically, the plaintiff will only be able to enjoin infringements of his selection of
statistics, but not his arrangement. Id.
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plaintiffs. 14 0 The Kregos litigation provides an example of how courts
have used Nimmer's approach regarding character protection in
determining infringement with respect to other types of copyrighted
works whose subject matter may be less clear-cut than conventionally
copyrighted works. Simply put, courts should understand whether a
work is copyrightable in the first place as a distinct issue from how to
prove infringement in any given situation.
C. Nonhuman Elements of Authorship
Landscape art such as Wildflower Works raises the issue of
what it means to "author" a work. In the amicus brief to the U.S.
Supreme Court submitted by the Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts and
the Arts & Business Council of Greater Boston, the attorneys for amici
curiae wrote: "On authorship, the Seventh Circuit drew a bright line
in the sand, stating that 'works owing their form to the forces of
nature cannot be copyrighted,' irrespective of what an artist may do to
control the visual perception of his subject." 41
Although "authorship" lies at the heart of copyright law, the
governing law is easily stated but difficult to apply. In Burrow-Giles
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, the Supreme Court defined an "author"
with the often-quoted language: "He to whom anything owes its origin;
originator; maker."142 The problem, however, is that "he to whom
anything owes its origin" can mean different things in different
contexts. Is "origin" to be understood as "physical origin," or does it
mean when an individual embraces the work intellectually,
emotionally, or both? Focusing on the physical origin emphasizes the
physical act of creativity, whereas focusing on the emotional or
intellectual origin emphasizes the process the creator used to make
the work of authorship. In this way, it is possible to understand the
difference between "physical origin" as product centered, and the
''emotional or intellectual" origin as process centered.
Although case law and legal commentary discuss physical
origin more commonly, both contain support for the process view of
"origin" that entails the author's intellectual or emotional validation of
140. Kregos v. Associated Press, 795 F. Supp. 1325, 1330 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd, 3 F.3d
656 (2d Cir. 1993). On remand, the district court held that the three-year statute of limitations
contained in section 507 barred a cause of action based on one of the defendant's forms. Id. With
respect to the more recent form, the court held, as a matter of law, that the defendant's form was
not substantially similar to the plaintiffs form, and therefore granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment on the copyright claims. Id. at 1331.
141. Brief for Blane De St. Croix, supra note 119, at 5 (quoting Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist.,
635 F.3d 290, 304 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 380 (2011)).
142. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884).
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the work. One famous example of this perspective appears in Alfred
Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc.: "A copyist's bad eyesight or
defective musculature, or a shock caused by a clap of thunder, may
yield sufficiently distinguishable variations. Having hit upon such a
variation unintentionally, the 'author' may adopt it as his and
copyright it."143 Professor Laura Heymann explicitly discusses this
process perspective in her work on authorship. She focuses on the
creator's "decision to assert that the work created is attributable to
oneself."144 "[T]he Copyright Act's 'author' is the individual (or entity)
who names herself as owner of the intellectual content of the
work-who looks at the paint inadvertently splattered on the canvas
or reviews the draft prepared by an assistant and declares, 'That is
mine."145 Heymann boldly concludes that "[c]opyright law might ...
better accomplish its goals if it took better account of the activities and
interests of authors rather than focusing on the products of their
creativity."146
The authorship determination should consider both the
tangible, physical actions of the creator, as well as the emotional and
intellectual components of the creative enterprise. The physical
components of authorship are easier to conceptualize, although the
Seventh Circuit's opinion in Kelley reveals that this determination
still can be problematic.147 Landscape art such as Wildflower Works
exemplifies a dynamic rather than static medium: "[ilts primary
medium is organic; it is always in process and is never perfected."148
Yet, fluidity and growth do not negate the presence of human
authorship because landscape art requires "constant curatorial
concern if the work is to be appreciated as envisaged." 49 The court in
Kelley did not understand that Wildflower Works "was entirely and
intentionally conceived, modeled, designed, organized, and physically
executed-and thus authored-by Mr. Kelley."150 Although the court
recognized "that Mr. Kelley specifically chose each plant bulb
according to his concept, brought the bulbs into a foreign environment,
deliberately planted and framed the bulbs with steel partitions and
143. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1951) (footnote
omitted).
144. Laura A. Heymann, A Tale of (At Least) Two Authors: Focusing Copyright Law on
Process Over Product, 34 J. CORP. L. 1009, 1015 (2009).
145. Id. at 1016 (noting that the Copyright Act is not "particularly clear on this point").
146. Id. at 1012.
147. See infra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
148. John Nivala, The Landscape Art of Daniel Urban Kiley, 29 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y REV. 267, 284 (2005).
149. Id.
150. Brief for Blane De St. Croix, supra note 119, at 6.
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gravel, and simultaneously arranged them in a unique sculptural
format," it rendered a decision concerning lack of authorship that "is
at odds with these undisputed facts." 15 1 The existence of "physical
authorship" in this case profitably compares to that which exists
when a surveillance camera takes a photograph. In the latter case,
meaningful physical human authorship is lacking; such is not the
situation with Wildflower Works.
The intellectual or emotional component of creativity presents
a more difficult area for decision, particularly with respect to works
that are fluid and dependent on the forces of nature to some degree.
Internationally renowned landscape artist Daniel Urban Kiley has
elucidated this area of inquiry by noting that there was an element of
his work that could not "really be designed at all; it consists of the
phenomena that occur as a landscape evolves throughout seasons and
time."15 2 According to Professor John Nivala, Kiley's work "'[i]s ...
not understood as something that has been designed and deliberately
constructed.' It looks as if it grew naturally in place." 1 53
This carefully nurtured sense of fluidity, combined with the
artist's embrace of the organic, natural development of the art, is what
lies at the core of creativity from the perspective of Jewish Process
Theology. It is steeped in a developmental perspective that reflects an
emphasis on Divine creativity as "a process of mobilizing continuous
self-creativity from within."154 Jewish Process Theology embraces the
internal evolution of life. This perspective emphasizes Divine
encouragement of each stage of creation to materialize, thus
culminating in Creation being understood as the result of God's
invitation "into the process of becoming."155 Thus, Creation can be
understood as a partnership between the Divine and that which is
created. The type of art created by people such as Chapman Kelley
and Daniel Urban Kiley exemplify this parallel. Their art is a
testament to the internal power possessed by their landscape
creations. As Part I discusses above, creativity theory evidences
numerous testimonial accounts of a partnership between authors and
151. Id. at 6 n.3.
152. Nivala, supra note 148, at 276 (quoting DAN KILEY & JANE AMIDON, DAN KILEY: THE
COMPLETE WORKS OF AMERICA'S MASTER LANDSCAPE ARCHITECT 109 (1999)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
153. Id. (quoting Anne Whiston Spirn, Seeing and Making the Landscape Whole, 72
PROGRESSIVE ARCHITECTURE 92, 92 (1991)). For a contrary, and perhaps a too simplistic,
perspective, see Cronin, supra note 10, at 245 ("The work of an artist who uses living materials
for his creations is more akin to that of a conductor or director than to that of a composer or
dramatist.").
154. Artson, supra note 12, at 17.
155. Id. at 18-19.
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their artistic creations. 56 In other words, artistic works become a
"partner" in their own creation. 15 7 The existence of this partnership
should not preclude a work's copyrightability.
III. VARA, MORAL RIGHTS, AND FLUID NATURE-DEPENDENT WORKS OF
AUTHORSHIP
Recall that because the Seventh Circuit determined that
Wildflower Works was not capable of copyright protection, it could not
gain protection under VARA either.15 8 The Seventh Circuit's opinion
noted that Kelley v. Chicago Park District "raises serious questions
about the meaning and application of VARA's definition of qualifying
works of visual art-questions with potentially decisive consequences
for this and other moral rights claims."159  The court correctly
identified that the VARA issue presented in the case involved the
right of integrity delineated in section 106A, which precludes any
"intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification" of a covered
work that "would be prejudicial to" the "honor or reputation" of the
author.o60 VARA provides a definition for qualifying works of visual
art as "a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single
copy."161 This same definition also provides a number of exclusions,
including the catch-all limitation that VARA does not apply to "any
work not subject to copyright protection under this title."6 2
The district court determined that Wildflower Works was both
a painting and a sculpture.163 Unfortunately, the Seventh Circuit was
unable to review this particular determination because the Chicago
Park District did not challenge this ruling-a move the court deemed
"an astonishing omission."164  Nonetheless, the realities of the
litigation process did not prevent the court from making some very
pointed observations with respect to the status of Wildflower Works
under VARA:
VARA's definition of "work of visual art" operates to narrow and focus the statute's
coverage; only a "painting, drawing, print, or sculpture," or an exhibition photograph
will qualify.... Copyright's broad general coverage extends to "original works of
156. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
157. See supra text accompanying note 71.
158. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
159. Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 302 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 380
(2011).
160. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(2)-(3) (2006).
161. Id. § 101.
162. Id.
163. Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., No. 04 C 07715, 2008 WL 4449886, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
29, 2008), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 635 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2011).
164. Kelley, 635 F.3d at 300.
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authorship," and this includes "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural" works. The use of the
adjectives "pictorial" and "sculptural" suggests flexibility and breadth in application. In
contrast VARA uses the specific nouns "painting" and "sculpture." To qualify for
moral-rights protection under VARA, Wildflower Works cannot just be "pictorial" or
"sculptural" in some aspect or effect, it must actually be a "painting" or a "sculpture."
Not metaphorically or by analogy, but really.
16 5
The history of VARA's enactment reveals the existence of
insufficient thought or attention to the content of the statute,
resulting in numerous problematic areas. 66 One point that is clear,
however, is that the statute's intent was to provide very circumscribed
federal statutory protection for only certain types of visual art.167 In
enumerating those works of visual art covered by VARA, the statute
establishes some basic parameters with respect to the requisite
originality, creativity, and aesthetics of the eligible works.168
Moreover, the case law supports an interpretation of VARA that
reinforces the statute's narrowly crafted scope of coverage. 169 In light
of this statutory posture, the Seventh Circuit was correct in its ruling
that the law should not consider Wildflower Works either a painting
or a sculpture under VARA. As the court observed, "VARA plainly
uses the terms 'painting' and 'sculpture' as words of limitation." 0
Although the Seventh Circuit properly applied VARA as
written, the statute fails to address critical issues concerning the
scope of moral rights protection in the United States. First, VARA's
limitations are too confining in that moral rights protection should
apply to works of authorship other than just visual art. Moreover,
only works satisfying a heightened standard of originality, as
manifested by substantial rather than "a modicum" of creativity,
should qualify for moral rights protection.171 Kelley requires
consideration of how such a statute with respect to moral rights
generally would incorporate issues specifically presented by fluid
works with nonhuman elements of authorship.
Part II argued that Jewish Process Theology supports a
copyright model that would include protection for such works.17 2 The
issue regarding moral rights protection is whether and how the
presence of fluidity and nonhuman elements of authorship mesh with
165. Id. (citation omitted).
166. KWALL, supra note 9, at 27-30, 74-75.
167. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
168. See id.
169. See KWALL, supra note 9, at 75 (providing a more complete discussion of these
issues).
170. Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 301 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 380
(2011).
171. KWALL, supra note 9, at 72 (internal quotation marks omitted).
172. See supra Part II.
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a standard requiring a heightened degree of originality with
substantial creativity. These considerations should not preclude
moral rights protection if the work in question otherwise manifests an
adequate degree of "heightened" original and creative human input.
This should remain true despite the existence of some forces of nature
that contribute to the work's ultimate form and appearance, and
render the work more seemingly fluid than some works of authorship.
As Part I discusses above, the key ingredients of both Divine
and human creativity according to Jewish Process Theology are
fluidity, partnership, and relationship. 1 73 Throughout the Seventh
Circuit's opinion in Kelley, these characteristics drive the court's
description of Wildflower Works. According to the facts recounted in
the opinion, Kelley selected the plant material for aesthetic and other
reasons and designed the initial placement of the flowers.1 74 He
supervised numerous volunteers who planted the seedlings and
continually nurtured the garden. 175 A temporary permit subsequently
issued to Kelley provided that he would "have responsibility and
control over matters relating to the aesthetic design and content" of
Wildflower Works. 76 The court also observed, however, that "the
forces of nature-the varying bloom periods of the plants; their spread
habits, compatibility, and life cycles; and the weather-produced
constant change."'77 Kelley was a "partner" with the work and with
nature in the creation of Wildflower Works. His work manifested not
only fluidity due to nature, but also the necessary collaborative
relationship in its creation and cultivation. This perspective is a
markedly different one from that which the court expressed:
Simply put, gardens are planted and cultivated, not authored. A garden's constituent
elements are alive and inherently changeable, not fixed. Most of what we see and
experience in a garden-the colors, shapes, textures, and scents of the
plants-originates in nature, not in the mind of the gardener. At any given moment in
time, a garden owes most of its form and appearance to natural forces, though the
gardener who plants and tends it obviously assists. All this is true of Wildflower Works,
even though it was designed and planted by an artist.1
7 8
The perspective of Jewish Process Theology developed in Part I
above reveals an alternate-and preferable-way of understanding
the creation of works of authorship and the consequent scope of
copyright and moral rights protection. Although the Seventh Circuit
made the foregoing observation in the context of denying the
173. See supra Part I.
174. Kelley, 635 F.3d at 293.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 294 (internal quotation marks omitted).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 304.
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copyrightability of Wildflower Works, Wildflower Works should
qualify not only for copyright but also moral rights protection. A
standard for moral rights that requires a heightened standard of
originality, would protect a work that manifests the requisite degree of
human creativity despite the presence of apparent fluidity and
nonhuman elements of authorship.179 The theoretical predicate for
this view derives from the fluidity that exists in all of Creation and
the author's relationship to the work's internal creative force.
IV. CONCLUSION
In denying copyright protection for Wildflower Works, the
Seventh Circuit stated: "[TIhe real barrier to copyright. . . is not
temporal but essential. The essence of a garden is its vitality, not its
fixedness. It may endure from season to season, but its nature is one
of dynamic change."180 Copyright law conventionally invokes this
perspective. Instead, copyright law might be better informed by an
alternative perspective focusing on Process Thought and Theology as
it has been developed in the Jewish tradition. This alternative
perspective would facilitate a more nuanced view regarding what
types of works of authorship deserve both copyright and moral rights
protection.
179. See Cronin, supra note 10, at 239, 252-53 (providing a contrary perspective
reflecting the more conventional understanding of copyright and moral rights protection in
connection with living works of art).
180. Kelley, 635 F.3d at 305.
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